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Abstract: 
The financial crisis has exposed the weaknesses in national and international 
economies, the disruption of the financial systems all over the world. The aim of this 
paper is to point out the importance of systemic risk management in the European 
Union (EU). Structured on two parts, the study presents the evaluation methods of the 
systemic risk in the mentioned area and the main proposals for the financial stability 
reconstruction. To conclude, deep reforms are needed: an adequate financial regulation 
and supervision, the evaluation of the performance over time, new rules for improving 
capital and liquidity and a better communication between institutions in order to 
prevent and neutralize possible distress.   
   
1. Introduction 
In the last few years, the financial system has become more complex; the connections 
between its components are the results of financial innovation and deregulation. An 
intense activity, an important amount of transactions and the speed of change reveal the 
consequences of the overexposure to risks. The loss of confidence, an increased 
uncertainty, the state of concern arising over the financial system produce serious 
effects in the real economy. According to European Central Bank (2010), the systemic 
risk is defined in terms of financial stability- the capacity of reducing and eliminating 
shocks, imbalances and disruption in order to allocate money to profitable investment 
opportunities. Direct and indirect linkages between financial institutions have conducted 
to rapid transmission of shocks. More than that, the failure of one institution generated 
negative effects in the financial system. Another definition place the systemic risk as the 
risk of ”widespread failures of financial institutions or freezing up of capital markets 
that can substantially reduce the supply of such intermediated capital to the real 
economy” [1, 4]. 
The current financial crisis shows that systemic episodes can arise both from solvency 
and liquidity concerns. The systemic events appear as a result of three forces: an 
increase in real estate prices, the fall of interest rates, an accelerated efficiency and 
availability of the refinancing opportunities. One of the main sources of instability is 
provided by the risk management policy.  
The reconstruction of a solid financial system demands a correct evaluation of the 
systemic risk and implies finding healthy solutions for countering the negative effects. 
  
2. The evaluation methods of the systemic risk in European Union 
The large dimension of the systemic risk makes it imperative to find a method of 
evaluation. Even though there have been many attempts to choose just one measure to 
monitor the risk at European level, none of them proved to be reliable. So, there are at 
least three approaches that can be used to detect systemic risk. 
First approach is taking into consideration a range of measures that can be used to 
discern when events become systemic, named financial soundness indicators (FSIs). 
These indicators are used to monitor the soundness of the financial system and to assess 
systemic risk. FSIs aggregate micro-prudential indicators are used by supervisors to 
assess soundness of a financial institution. This way they can detect risk to the financial 
system as a whole that might be missed by micro-prudential indicators.  
TAB.1.Macroprudential Indicators of Financial System Soundness 
Aggregated micro prudential indicators Macroeconomic indicators 
I. Capital adequacy  Economic growth 
II. Asset quality Balance of payments 
II.1. Lending institution Inflation  
Borrowing entity Interest and exchange rate 
Management soundness Lending and asset price booms 
Earning and profitability Contagion effects 
Liquidity Other factors 
Sensitivity to market risk  
Market-based indicators  
Source: Evans, O., Leone, A., Gill, M., Hilbers, P. – Macro-prudential 
Indicators of Financial System Soundness, IMF Occasional Papers, Washington DC, 
2000, p. 9 
 
The second approach refers to the inter linkages between financial institutions, both 
domestically and internationally. To indentify the linkages between financial firms there 
can be used four directions [5, 2]:  
- the network approach, which tracks the transmission of financial stress across the 
banking system via linkages in the interbank market;  
- the co-risk model, which uses market data on credit default swaps to assess how the 
default risk of an institution is affected by the default risk of another institution; 
- the distress dependence matrix, which allows analysts to study a group of financial 
institutions and to assess the probability of distress for a pair of institutions, taking into 
account a set of other institutions;  
- the default intensity model, which captures the likelihood of default of a large fraction 
of financial institutions through linkages. 
The final approach takes into consideration data from individual financial institutions in 
order to identify what entities are most likely to experience pressures. A recent study 
conducted by IMF shows that while information from individual financial institutions 
can help guard against systemic risk, not all such information is useful. Also, data 
collection problems, both in terms of the number of institutions covered and in terms of 
the timeliness of the data, are likely to be important. The number of systemically 
important institutions is far smaller than the total number of institutions, and data 
availability is less likely to be a problem in the case of large institutions. 
 
3. The main directions for limiting systemic risk in the European Union  
European Union states are characterized by diversity of the architecture and structure of 
financial systems. These circumstances make more difficult finding solution against 
systemic risk, because each country has different approaches regarding oversight and 
regulation of its own financial system. 
The crisis highlighted the new needs of European Union on supervision of financial 
services. The European Parliament, the most important legislative institution of EU sets 
three principles regarding European financial system: 
- a closer regulation and supervision of alternative investment funds (hedge and equity 
funds); 
- supplementary capital requirements for European banks and a new approach about the 
bonuses that these financial institutions pay out; 
- the supervision of the financial sector – at micro and macro level [3,1]. 
One of the proposed directives has the main objective to ensure that all alternative 
investment funds will be over sighted and regulated without exemptions. Every fund 
will have an European passport and the possibility of developing financial activities in 
EU. Non-EU funds will be authorized by Member States. Also, the managers of such 
funds should inform the national supervisors of the leverage limit. Excessive 
compensation of this managers encouraged excessive risk taking. The G20 Pittsburgh 
Summit set principles regarding financial system stability, including a compensation 
based on a long-term value creation. Financial activities based on derivates become 
extremely important today because of their potential risk in triggering systemic 
problems. The European financial institutions must work with derivates in certain limits 
of risk-taking. Derivates should retrieve their most important role: reducing a specific 
risk and correcting an anomaly from a financial market. 
In order to ensure the stability of banking system, a vital component of the system, the 
European Parliament sets Capital Requirements Directives III [4,1]. Through this 
directive, the European Commission wants to revise EU rules on capital requirements: 
impose higher capital requirements for re-securitizations, limiting securitization 
exposures and restrictiveness about risk-taking. Regarding executives bonuses, the 
directive set maximum cash bonuses of 30%, at least 40% differed for at least three to 
five years, at least 50% will be remunerated in shares and the discretionary pension 
benefits should also be in shares. 
These new directions for European financial institutions should reduce the systemic risk 
and make them more powerful facing the crisis. We consider that expanding stress-tests 
on a large base of financial institutions may discover weakness in system. Also, the role 
of central banks should be extended over the procedures of commercial banks regarding 
customer creditworthiness. Even the negative effect of re-securitizations may be 
reduced is the basement is solid with clients who can return their credits. 
Monitoring and assessing the potential risks and threats during the crisis were weak and 
incapable to diminish the negative effects manifested in European financial system. This 
is the reason for creating the European Systemic Risk Board, a new authority with 
responsibilities in detecting irregularities manifested in the countries’ financial systems.  
European Systemic Risk Board will have to issue warnings regarding all the potential 
risks and make recommendations to a country or group of countries for the good 
functioning of the whole financial system. A potential warning may be made public, 
depending of effects that can appear in case of publicity.   
The new authority will include all central banks governors from the 27 Member States, 
as well as the countries which haven’t adopted the euro yet. Assuring a global 
supervision implies the presence of other authorities like European Supervisory 
Authorities and national supervisors.   
The existing European supervisory committees will be replaced by a European Banking 
Authority (EBA), European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) 
and a European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA). They will be a part of a 
network of financial supervisors and will aim a closer supervision of European financial 
system components. The future of supervision in European Union includes cooperation 
between these three institutions, ESRB and the national supervisory authorities.  
The main advantage of European Systemic Risk Board should be the multinational 
power in regulating and supervising different institutions from all the financial system. 
Theoretical issues may look encouraging, but the differences between financial system 
architecture may be a problem in implementing directions of action in European 
countries. There are many arguments regarding the existence of such institution. An 
appropriate regulation and setting clear responsibilities for each supervisor in every 
country and for each segment of financial system is a necessary measure which can 
guarantee the success. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The recent financial crisis highlighted once again the importance of risk management  
policies. The systemic events appear as a result of individual actions of financial 
institutions even though they are highly interconnected. Taking into consideration the 
fact that financial stability is defined as the absence of the systemic risk, it is very 
important to identify the possible sources of it. Policy makers tried to apply different 
measuring methods and concluded that there are at least three approaches: financial 
soundness indicators, the linkages between financial institutions and the individual 
evaluation of firms. Designing an appropriate framework for the systemic risk must be 
followed by efficient proposals and action in order to improve financial stability. Risk 
management should focus on regulation and the quality of supervision. New directives 
have the role to ensure an optimal level of capital, liquidity and solvency. Macro-
financial surveillance and macro-prudential supervision are vital and that makes 
credible the need for a multinational power - European Systemic Risk Board - an 
institution capable to assure a global supervision. 
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